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Abstract— The dramatic growth in smartphone malware 
shows that malicious program developers are shifting from 
traditional PC systems to smartphone devices. Therefore, 
security researchers are also moving towards proposing novel 
antimalware methods to provide adequate protection. This paper 
proposes a Blockchain-Based Malware Detection Framework 
(B2MDF) for detecting malicious mobile applications in mobile 
applications marketplaces (app stores). The framework consists 
of two internal and external private blockchains forming a dual 
private blockchain as well as a consortium blockchain for the 
final decision. The internal private blockchain stores feature 
blocks extracted by both static and dynamic feature extractors, 
while the external blockchain stores detection results as blocks 
for current versions of applications. B2MDF also shares feature 
blocks with third parties, and this helps antimalware vendors to 
provide more accurate solutions. 
Keywords— Antimalware, Blockchain, Private Blockchain, 
Smartphone Malware, Mobile App Store. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The estimated five billion mobile subscribers worldwide in 
2017 proves the impact of mobile on people lives. 
Furthermore, the unique mobile subscribers are predicted to 
reach 71% of the world's population in 2025 [1]. According to 
McAfee Mobile Threat Report [2], 2017 was the year of 
explosion in mobile malware. Moreover, it is anticipated that 
2019 will be even riskier for smartphone users, and the 
increasing rate of smartphone users convinced malware 
developers to move towards creating mobile malware. In 2017 
Kaspersky detected 5,730,916 malicious installation packages, 
94,368 mobile banking Trojans, and 544,107 mobile 
ransomware Trojans. Google as a prominent Android App 
store developed Google Bouncer for scanning both new 
applications and those already in the market [3]. However, 
attackers could still bypass Google Bouncer to send malware 
into Google's App store (Google Play) [4]. Moreover, the 
increasing rate of malicious apps proves inefficiency of 
malware detection system used by Mobile Application 
Marketplace [5]. 
In order to deliver adequate computer systems protection, 
antimalware solutions should be capable of detecting a very 
wide range of existing malicious programs [6] as well as 
detecting new modifications of known malware samples or 
new zero-day malicious programs from a recent new malware 
generation [7].  
Recently and after the success story of blockchain on 
financial applications, it is rapidly entering into various 
applications such as healthcare, Internet of Things (IoT), Smart 
Contracts and Governmental applications [8], [9] A blockchain 
is a shared network of databases (distributed ledger) spread 
across multiple entities that facilitate the process of recording 
transactions and tracking assets [10]. There are three types of 
blockchain: 
 Public blockchain: anyone in the world can read and send 
transactions, and expect to see their valid transactions into 
the blockchain, and anyone can participate in the consensus 
process. 
 Private blockchain: write permissions are kept to one 
organization while read permissions may be public or 
restricted to certain participants. 
 Consortium blockchain: a blockchain where the consensus 
process is controlled by a pre-selected set of nodes, for 
example, 2/3 of all participants must sign a block to be 
appended to the blockchain. 
This paper proposes a framework for detecting malicious 
applications in online mobile app stores. We integrate feature 
extraction into a private blockchain to extract features for 
feeding to detection engines which determine if an application 
is malicious based on available feature blocks. The consortium 
blockchain provide mechanism of final decision by considering 
results of all detection engines. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II reviews some related research. Section III describes 
our proposed framework for detecting malware samples in app 
stores. Finally, section IV discusses about the achievements of 
this paper and concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Most mobile malware detection systems are focused on 
local file analysis [11]. Malware analysis involves two key 
techniques: static analysis and dynamic analysis [12]. Static 
analysis examines malware without actually executing it to 
find malicious characteristics or suspicious codes [13], while 
dynamic analysis (also known as behavior analysis) executes 
malware in a controlled and monitored environment to observe 
its behavior [14]. Malware detection through detecting of 
anomalies in battery consumption and power usage pattern  
[15], operating system libraries [16] are some of dynamic 
malware detection approaches. A recent research by Gu et al. 
[17] attempted to implement Consortium Blockchain for 
Malware Detection and Evidence Extraction (CB-MDEE) as a 
decentralized malware detection system based on blockchain 
technology. CB-MDEE framework consists of consortium 
blockchain and public blockchain, and includes four layers, 
namely the network layer, the storage layer, the support layer, 
and the application layer. However, CB-MDEE may not be 
applicable in reality as it forces users’ to install a customized 
application for data collection. 
A mobile application may be scanned in two stages. After 
uploading an app by developers to the app store, the security 
module of app store performs the first initial scan to confirm 
the normal behavior of the application [18]. Apps which pass 
the initial security check will be available for download in app 
stores [19]. Third party anti-malware applications perform their 
own scans after installation completion. Since more of these 
anti-malware vendors often follow almost the same approach 
with the first initial scan performed by app stores they may not 
be as useful as they claim. Therefore, improving the accuracy 
of detection mechanisms used by app store for the initial first 
scan may decrease the rate of malware victims. 
III. BLOCKCHAIN FOR MALWARE DETECTION 
Fig.  1 illustrates the proposed framework for detecting 
malicious mobile applications in Mobile Applications 
Marketplaces. The structure consists of two internal and 
external private blockchains forming a dual private blockchain. 
The Internal Private Blockchain (IPB) includes all Feature 
Extractor (FE) components to develop and extend the 
Dedicated Internal Private Blockchain (DIPB) of each 
available mobile application. 
A. Internal Private Blockchain (IPB) 
Each application is tracking with a Dedicated Internal 
Private Blockchain (DIPB) that follows useful information 
(features) showing the app's behavioral history and static 
information is dependent on FE components as members of 
DIPBs. In other words, an FE extracts valuable information 
during app's lifespan, and extend the related DPB by adding 
new blocks. Note that we consider one DIPB for each app to 
avoid creating a tangled blockchain due to the tremendous 
number of applications in the marketplace (app store). Having 
dedicated Private Blockchains (PB) also brings us simplicity in 
processing and computation of the blockchains. As shown in 
Fig.  1 each FE component has full access to the DIPBs 
through a bi-directional connection, while other nodes of the 
IPB have read-only access determined by one-directional 
arrows in the figure. 
1) Static Features Extractors 
These features are extracted from Android’s application 
files. Each application in Android is in .apk format and is a 
type of archive file, specifically in zip format packages based 
on the JAR file format. The MIME type associated with APK 
files is application/vnd.android.package-archive. The .apk file 
comprises both code and resources of file just similar .jar files. 
Android packages contain all the necessary files for a single 
Android program and encapsulate valuable information that 
can help in understanding an application’s behavior.  
Fig.  2 depicts major partitions of an APK file while Table 
1 describes each entry of an android APK file. 
The AndroidManifest.xml file available in APK file 
provides the application’s package name, version components 
and other metadata (see Table II). 
 
 
Fig. 1. The architecture of our proposed blockchain-based 
mobile malware detection framework (B2MDF). 
 Fig.  2. An APK file structure 
TABLE I.  ANDROID APK FILE STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION 
Entry Notes 
AndroidMa
nifest.xml 
the manifest file in binary XML format. 
classes.dex application code compiled in the dex format. 
resources.ar
sc 
file containing precompiled application resources, in 
binary XML 
res/ folder containing resources not compiled into 
resources.arsc 
assets/ optional folder containing applications assets, which 
can be retrieved by AssetManager. 
lib/ optional folder containing compiled code - i.e. native 
code libraries. 
META-
INF/ 
folder containing the MANIFEST.MF file, which 
stores meta data about the contents of the JAR. which 
sometimes will be store in a folder named original. 
The signature of the APK is also stored in this folder. 
TABLE II.  SOME DETAILS OF ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML 
Attributes Notes 
Manifest tag contains android installation mode, package name, 
build versions 
Activity Declares an activity that implements part of the 
application visual user interface. 
uses-feature Declares a single hardware or software feature that 
is used by the application. 
uses-
permissions 
requests a permission that must be granted in order 
for it to operate, full list of permission API can be 
found in [20]. 
Permissions custom permission and protection level 
Application The declaration of the application. Will contains all 
the activity 
intent-filter Specifies the types of intents that an activity, 
service, or broadcast receiver can respond to. 
provider Declares a content provider component. A content 
provider is a subclass of ContentProvider that 
supplies structured access to data managed by the 
application. 
receiver Broadcast receivers enable applications to receive 
intents that are broadcast by the system or by other 
applications, even when other components of the 
application are not running. 
service Declare a service as one of the application 
components. 
 
Therefore, according to Table I and Table II, the following 
components may provide the static analysis of APK files: 
 Opcode sequence FE component: Used to extract 
sequence of opcode from APK file to provide 
opcode analysis for Detection Engines (DE) of 
Consortium Blockchains. 
 Permission FE component: Used to detect 
permissions requested at runtime as declared in the 
Manifest file. 
 API calls FE component: Used to detect use of API’s 
e.g. Telephony Manager APIs for accessing IMSI, 
IMEI, sending/receiving SMS, listing/installing other 
packages etc. 
 Commands FE component: Used to detect references 
to system commands e.g. ‘chmod’, ‘mount’ 
‘/system/bin/su’ ‘chown, etc. 
2) Dynamic Features Extractors 
Dynamic analysis based techniques attempt to detect 
malware applications by monitoring the runtime behavior of an 
app to extract useful behavioral features.  
a) System Call FE 
System calls traces often used by debuggers to control 
processes can be a valuable material for dynamic analysis. 
System calls such as file access, network connection, inter-
process communication, or privilege escalation are the most 
common calling traces used by dynamic analyzers. “open, read, 
write, fork, fstat, mprotect, read, fork, write, close” is an 
example of a system call trace with 10 sequential activities. 
b) Memory and CPU FE 
All the features related to memory and CPU that can be 
accessed in Android. 53 features can be extracted for each 
running android application. Five CPU related features and 48 
memory related features are listed in [21]. Total CPU usage, 
user CPU usage, and Kernel CPU usage are examples of CPU 
related features, while total heap size, total heap free and total 
heap allocated are sample features for memory. 
Recall that all or a few of the mentioned Static and 
Dynamic FEs may contribute to DIPBs of each application as a 
member of the IPB. As demonstrated in Fig.  1, there are other 
nodes in IPB with read-only access such as third parties anti-
malware applications and DE agents contributing to the DEPBs 
that need the information (features) provided by FECs of IPB. 
Accessing the information blocks facilitates third parties to 
contribute in scanning applications while it also provides 
competition between anti-malware vendors to develop more 
accurate detection methods. 
B. External Private Blockchain (EPB) 
Instead of DIPB in IPB, there is a Dedicated External 
Private Blockchain (DECB) for each application containing 
scanning information of different versions of applications 
namely malice scores assigned by each DE to each version of 
an application. Finally, the data stored in DECB of each 
application shows the history and summaries of DE’s scanning 
results by each DE. The Detection Engines (DEs) benefits 
separate detection mechanisms utilizing special methods and 
algorithms for distinguishing malware samples from benign 
samples.  Two basic DEs can be defined as the following:  
1) Artificial Intelligent-based DEs 
Recent developments in intelligent detection mechanisms 
based on machine learning and artificial intelligence provide 
the opportunity of detecting new unseen malicious applications 
[22]. There are several powerful algorithms and methods for 
separating malware samples from normal apps that can be used 
as DEs of the EPB. Each DE may perform their desired 
preprocessing stage on stored data in DIPBs of IPB to provide 
inputs for the machine learning task. 
2) Signature-based DEs 
Signature-based detection mechanisms proved that they 
provide robust methods for detecting malware samples based 
on one or more tokens or signatures. In a pretty simple form, a 
signature base mechanism may check hash codes of APK files 
to determine whether a testing sample is malicious. 
C. Consortium Blockchain (CB) and Determinant Agent 
Each DE is also an active participant of the Consortium 
Blockchain (CB). DEs may classify an app as malicious or 
benign according to shreds of evidence available in EPB's 
DEPBs. DEs append their decision and considered pieces of 
evidence to DEPBs of apps. A decision can be achieving 
classification results (or malicious score) for an app. The CB 
assists Determinant Agent for the final decision showing 
whether an app is malicious. When a DE wants to announce an 
application as malicious or benign, it attempts to append a new 
block to the app's CB. Recall that according to previously 
agreed consensus policy of the CB, a block (decision 
information) must be accepted (signed) by a wide number of 
participants e.g. 2/3 of all participants must validate the 
decision.  The CB in Fig.  1 shows that there may be other 
nodes with read-only access. In fact, third-party applications 
may want to check and use the blockchain of DE decisions for 
their anti-malware solutions. Finally, The Determinant Agent 
considers the dedicated CB of an application to determine if an 
application is malicious, and may also give detailed 
information about the type of the malware such as malware 
family, payload type, etc. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed B2MDF as a malware detection 
framework based on a tailored-made blockchain architecture to 
detect malicious mobile applications in app stores before 
downloading by final users. Combining static analysis and 
dynamic analysis as an integrated solution for malware 
detection, in most cases, decreases the false positive rate of 
detection systems. The framework uses general detection 
engines, and it means B2MDF does not limit the 
implementation to any specific machine learning algorithms. 
B2MDF also provides useful features for third parties to 
develop their antimalware solutions as app stores may be more 
accurate in extracting features from a new uploaded sample. 
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